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Abstract
Background: The development of Herceptin® is welcomed as a major advance in breast cancer treatment, while
Myriad’s development of BRACAnalysis® is a widely used diagnostic. However useful and successful this product is,
its presence in the public eye is tainted by predominantly negative press about gene patenting and business
practices.
Discussion: While retrospection invites a sharp contrast between Genentech’s triumphal narrative of scientific
achievement and Myriad’s public image as a controversial monopolist, a comparative history of these companies’
products reveals two striking consistencies: patents and public discontent. Despite these similarities, time has
reduced the narrative to that of hero versus villain: Genentech is lauded - at least for the final outcome of the
Herceptin® story - as a corporate good citizen, Myriad as a ruthless mercenary. Since patents undergird both
products yet the narratives are so different, the stories raise the question: why have patents taken the fall as the
scapegoat in current biotechnology policy debate?
Summary: A widely publicized lawsuit and accompanying bad press have cast Myriad as a villain in the evolving
narrative of biotechnology. While the lawsuit suggests that this villainy is attributable to Myriad’s intellectual
property, we suggest through a comparative case study that, at least in the Myriad case, it is not simply about the
patents but also other business strategies the company chose to pursue. Patents were a necessary but not
sufficient cause of controversy.
Background
Introduction
On 29 March 2010, Judge Robert Sweet of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New
York shocked the world of intellectual property law with
his ruling in Association for Molecular Pathology v. US
Patent and Trademark Office (the ‘Myriad’ case). He
ruled that Myriad Genetics’ patents on the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes claimed non-patentable DNA molecules
and methods [1]. Attorneys Dan Vorhaus and John Con-
ley wryly observed, ‘pigs fly,’ [2] at least for awhile in the
District Court. Meeting the same fate as the mythical
Icarus, the wings constructed by Judge Sweet melted
under the scrutiny of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) on 29 July 2011 [3], and were
argued again before CAFC on 20 July 2012 by order of
the United States Supreme Court. The case was
appealed again to the US Supreme Court on 25 Septem-
ber 2012, and certiorari was granted on 30 November
2012 [4-6]]. The case will be heard by the Supreme
Court on April 15, 2013 with a decision before July.
Through the eyes of patent practitioners, Judge
Sweet’s decision was an anomaly, but it is just another
episode in shifting jurisprudence, with a succession of
cases between CAFC and the Supreme Court. This case
could become another decision that narrows the scope
of patent protection. Indeed, it already has, with Myr-
iad’s broad method claims being invalidated by both the
district court and CAFC. Backed by a decade of prece-
dent patenting genes, the patents that Myriad Genetics
holds on BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes continue a long-
standing pattern of granting similar patents in the Uni-
ted States [7]. Accounts of the gene discoveries widely
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acknowledge that aside from contribution to science and
society, patents and publication were the brass rings to
be grabbed by contenders in the great race of 1990 to
1995 to identify, clone, and sequence BRCA1 and
BRCA2 [8-11]]. While there have been gene patent con-
troversies over the years, none has approached the
intensity of public conflict over BRCA patents [5]. Even
before the current litigation began, policy reports
around the world cited BRCA far more often than any
other gene patents [12], and public news media coverage
is far more extensive for BRCA than other gene patents
cases (most of it strongly negative coverage) [13].
Why have these particular patents aroused such
intense controversy? As patent scholar Rebecca Eisen-
berg noted, ‘Significant opposition to gene patenting
within the medical and scientific communities did not
arise until the patentability of DNA had long been
established’ [7,14]. It may be helpful to assess whether
the controversy should properly be attributed to patents
themselves, or to unpopular business practices that Myr-
iad could put in place because of patent exclusivity that
made it the only US commercial BRCA testing service.
Should the focus be on whether Myriad should have
gotten patents at all, or also on what Myriad did with
them?
To assess the extent that the patents played a role in
the malcontent amassed against Myriad, we selected a
comparable story of product evolution as a point of
comparison: Genentech’s Herceptin®. While not directly
comparable because Herceptin® is a therapeutic and
BRACAnalysis® is a diagnostic, the development of Her-
ceptin® nonetheless resembles that of BRACAnalysis®
in several respects. Both are novel breakthroughs in
managing breast cancer. Both were brought to market
by biotechnology companies. Both products were mainly
developed in the 1990s. Most importantly, for the pur-
poses of this analysis, both inventions were patented.
Among the differing elements of these two stories is
profoundly different public reception. Instead of a pubic
outcry in the form of a very public lawsuit, Genentech
was celebrated with a corporate leadership award from
the National Breast Cancer Coalition [14]. Thus, to
answer the question of what role patents have played in
public perceptions of Myriad, we have sought to com-
pare Myriad’s corporate history with Genentech’s devel-
opment of Herceptin® with significant patent protection
on a novel product, which encountered a very different
reception from a similar constituency at more or less
the same time.
Methods
To assess the question posed in our thesis, we compared
Myriad’s development of BRACAnalysis® to Genentech’s
Herceptin®, in order to assess the role of patents relative
to other factors, such as engagement of the constituen-
cies most directly affected (people at risk of developing
breast and ovarian cancer) and compliance with health
professional standards and norms. We constructed this
history by surveying the relevant literature, US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports, corporate
statements, media reports, patent databases, and off-the-
record interviews with relevant actors. In this analysis,
we attempt to isolate patent and non-patent factors,
describing how Myriad and Genentech developed their
respective products. This includes differences between
therapeutics and diagnostics, how professional guidelines
were treated, and most importantly how the companies
dealt with intense controversy among breast cancer con-
stituencies. One crucial difference is how the companies
dealt with the nationally recognized and well-organized
advocacy organizations when conflict with those organi-
zations erupted. We will first provide a basic historical
overview of how BRACAnalysis® and Herceptin® were





On 17 October 1990, geneticist Mary-Claire King, then
at the University of California, Berkeley, made a ground-
breaking announcement to the American Society of
Human Genetics: her team had discovered a genetic
linkage to breast and ovarian cancer on chromosome 17
[10]. This followed a strategy of locating a gene on the
chromosomes by studying families with an inheritance
pattern suggesting mutations in a single gene. She found
the linkage by comparing multiple affected and unaf-
fected members in such families. The strategy was pio-
neered by finding a genetic locus associated with risk of
Huntington’s disease on the tip of chromosome 4 in
1983 [15]. Thereafter, several ‘genes for’ cystic fibrosis,
Alzheimer’s disease, neurofibromatosis, and other condi-
tions were identified by cloning and sequencing DNA
from the region and identifying disease-associated muta-
tions [15-17]]. King extended the strategy to breast can-
cer, not then commonly considered a ‘genetic’
condition. She focused on families that had many mem-
bers affected by breast cancer at a young age, suggesting
a broken gene might be found. It turned out that ovar-
ian and some other cancers also traveled in these
families, in a pattern consistent with inheritance of a
single mutated gene increasing risk of both ovarian and
breast cancers. King and her colleagues thus located but
did not clone and sequence the gene. “King’s discovery
was like tracing the correct address to the confines of
New York City,” the starting flare for an intense race to
clone and sequence the gene by finding disease-causing
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mutations [10]. It was often characterized as a hunt for
the ‘breast cancer gene’, but it was not quite that.
Rather, it was a hunt for mutations that altered a gene
whose biological function was entirely unknown, but the
consequence of its mutation was predisposition to cer-
tain cancers. The race lasted four years, fluctuating
between intense international competition and periods
of team collaboration.
As the search dragged on, the incentives of pride,
patents, and publication were leavened by diagnostic
hope - being able to unmask the silent hereditary preda-
tor that had devastated and stigmatized generations of
women. The contenders were among the biggest names
worldwide in human genetics research and, in the end,
it was the team working with Mark Skolnick of Myriad
Genetics that uncovered the BRCA1 sequence by finding
cancer-associated mutations. In August 1994, Skolnick
announced that he had uncovered the BRCA1 gene [10].
Earlier that month, another contributor to hereditary
cancer had been unmasked when a putative BRCA2
gene was tentatively located on chromosome 13, by
Michael Stratton and his team of UK scientists [18].
Stratton’s results identifying this sequence as the BRCA2
sequence were published in Nature in 1995 [19]. In
1996, Myriad’s team, arguing that Stratton’s published
sequence was incomplete, followed this publication with
the complete sequence and a more extensive mutational
analysis [20]. That resulted from another race that cul-
minated in cloning and sequencing mutations in BRCA2
in 1995 [10]. The BRCA2 race ended in a dead heat
between a group led by Michael Stratton in the UK and
the Myriad/Utah team in Utah [21,22].
Myriad’s work was partially funded by government
grants to the University of Utah. Some work was done by
government scientists at the National Institute for Envir-
onmental Health Sciences, and some was done by Myriad
itself, using funds from its investors and under an agree-
ment with Eli Lilly & Co. Myriad thus co-funded the
work, and it was no secret that patents would be sought.
And patenting was not confined to Myriad, Mary-Claire
King’s linkage method was patented and licensed to
OncorMed by the University of California, and
OncorMed itself had a US patent on BRCA1 (see below).
Myriad filed its first BRCA1 patent applications in
August 1994, and this initial application ripened into
several patents, starting with the grant of its first
BRCA1 patent, 5,693,472 in 1997 [10,23] OncorMed
already had a BRCA1 patent covering the consensus
wild-type sequence [24]. In 1998, OncorMed sued Myr-
iad and then Myriad counter-sued for patent infringe-
ment. This case ultimately settled, with rights going to
Myriad under a confidential agreement [9]. The patents
originally assigned to OncorMed and Gene Logic have
since been re-assigned to Myriad.
Using these patent rights, Myriad Genetics became the
sole commercial testing service for mutations in BRCA1
and BRCA2 in the United States. A patient carrying a
mutation in these genes can have up to an 87% risk for
developing breast cancer and a 44% chance of develop-
ing ovarian cancer in a lifetime [25]. Studies have shown
that patients with deleterious mutations can reduce
their risk of cancer through prophylactic measures such
as taking tamoxifen or other chemopreventive agents, or
surgical removal of breasts and ovaries [26,27].
Armed with intellectual property protection on both
compositions of matter (claims on isolated DNA mole-
cules) and diagnostic methods, Myriad developed its
BRACAnalysis® test [28]. It is the first-line diagnostic in
high-risk families with early-onset breast and ovarian
cancer, with second-line testing for major rearrange-
ments (Myriad’s BART® test) or sequencing 20 other
genes for mutations in other genes that are much less
common but can also confer inherited cancer risk (tests
available from Ambry Genetics and academic labora-
tories). BRACAnalysis® is Myriad’s flagship product,
accounting for over $400 million in revenue and 80% of
Myriad’s revenues in 2011, with BART® and other tests
for inherited risk of pancreatic cancer, colorectal cancer,
melanoma and other tests accounting for most of the
rest of Myriad’s revenues [29].
Clinicians and patients alike readily acknowledge that
Myriad performs very well in doing tests, reporting
results, marketing, and obtaining reimbursement from
third-party payers. Myriad is quite proficient and com-
petitive with other genetic diagnostic companies [24].
However, in the years since Skolnick’s impressive dis-
covery, the corporate image of Myriad Genetics has con-
sistently been unpopular. Caulfield, Bubela, and
Murdoch reviewed English-language newspaper articles
on Myriad Genetics and the BRCA gene patents in
many countries [13]. Not only did Myriad’s gene patents
garner more international news attention than other
gene patenting controversies, but also 77.6% of these
articles had a negative tone.
This presents an anomaly: a company that is widely
regarded as being an efficient laboratory, was a startup
that helped discover the genetic cause of two dread can-
cers and provides a service that allows people at risk to
mitigate the risk is nonetheless reviled. This should be a
hero story but is instead a dark narrative. Why? The
contrast with Genentech and Herceptin®, a product that
developed at more or less the same time and for an
extensively overlapping customer base, is striking.
Genentech
The beginning of the Herceptin® story begins not at
Genentech, but at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology’s Whitehead Institute, where Robert Weinberg
discovered the gene that led to one of the most
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significant discoveries in breast cancer therapeutics [30].
However, neu (christened for its original discovery in rat
brain tumors) was found when looking for cancer-asso-
ciated genes, when studying basic molecular and cellular
events associated with cancer; its clinical significance
beyond advancing basic cancer biology was not immedi-
ately apparent. It was not until 1989 that Axel Ullrich,
Dennis Slamon and colleagues published the relevance
of the Her-2/neu gene (re-christened in deference to Sla-
mon, Ullrich, and Weinberg’s work) [31]. Over-expres-
sing Her-2/neu was associated with a particularly nasty
form of breast cancer. One strategy to address this was
to find an antibody that would bind to the Her-2/neu
protein in hopes of inhibiting its effects, thus countering
its overexpression. The promise of potentially curing
women with an aggressively recurring type of breast
cancer without the ‘kill, burn, and slash’ combination of
chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery was eventually rea-
lized in Herceptin®, the resulting therapeutic. The
monoclonal antibody inhibiting Her-2/neu was patented
and manufactured by Genentech, which has continued
to produce it as Herceptin®.
Genentech’s management of Herceptin® did not
always garner good will among national breast cancer
advocates. Indeed, Genentech got off to a rocky start, as
it was reluctant to plow resources into a monoclonal
antibody product, given the many disappointments from
monoclonal antibody therapeutics over the previous
decade [30]. And at the time, cancer was not widely
regarded as a promising target for ‘blockbuster’ drugs,
especially when this proposed product would be for the
minority of those with breast cancer who showed Her-2/
neu over-expression. Slamon was a constant clinical
champion, and apparently also sometimes regarded as a
thorn in the side of Genentech senior management [30].
Women from Breast Cancer Action (BCA) in San
Francisco demonstrated actively outside Genentech
headquarters to pressure the company into providing
access to the then-experimental treatment. Genentech
contacted Fran Visco from the National Breast Cancer
Coalition (NBCC), a national umbrella advocacy organi-
zation. She agreed to help develop the clinical studies
needed to show clinical safety and efficacy, so long as
NBCC and other authentic patient representatives were
fully engaged and ‘at the table’ in helping design and
carry out the trials [30]. In no small part because of
NBCC’s standing as a highly credible national advocacy
organization, the trials needed to generate data for Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval proceeded
apace.
The initial clinical trials were quite promising, and
despite several fits and starts by Genentech and its
then-partial owner Roche, Herceptin® received FDA
approval in 1998. As a specific therapy, Herceptin® was
only effective on the 25% of tumors that expressed high
levels of Her-2/neu [32]. While it was not effective for
most breast cancers, many patients who responded to it
improved dramatically. In early clinical trials, patients
with advanced disease lived 5 months longer when trea-
ted with Herceptin® and chemotherapy [32]. A 2005
New England Journal of Medicine article reported that
Herceptin® reduced relapses by half in women who
started treatment early [33]. Herceptin’s success was so
widely celebrated during its early clinical trial stage that
Genentech was deluged with demands for a compassio-
nate access program to provide the drug for terminal
patients looking for a last chance at therapy [30].
In 2009, Roche’s partial ownership of Genentech
became full acquisition, combining Genentech’s opera-
tions into Roche’s [34]. In the last full year before this
acquisition, a January 2009 SEC filing reported that
Genentech generated $9.5 billion profit from US pro-
duct sales out of operating revenue of $13.4 billion. Her-
ceptin® sales accounted for $336 million of those
revenues in 2008 [34,35]. In 2011, global Herceptin®
sales reached $5.728 billion [35].
BRCA testing and Herceptin® had parallel trajectories:
both contributed novel insights into breast cancer and
had clinical implications that demonstrably improved
survival; both were brought to market by start-up bio-
technology firms; both staked patent rights as part of
the business model; and both products became signifi-
cant profit centers. These common factors belie dra-
matic differences in the public reception accorded these
two products. The contributing differences lie in each
company’s corporate practice and in the nature of the
products they were developing. In the case of Myriad’s
reputation, ill will is arguably due less to the patents
Myriad acquired than the way it deployed them.
Assertion of patent protection
The strength and extent of intellectual property protec-
tion is largely determined by the enforcement of granted
rights. Herceptin® and BRACAnalysis® demonstrate the
broad spectrum of patent use, illustrating how the pro-
tection of intellectual property plays out in public
debate. Once it secured patents, Myriad was quick to
pursue aggressive enforcement actions against public
and academic institutions both in the United States and
internationally. Two particularly salient examples were
conflicts with the University of Pennsylvania and the
Canadian Province of Ontario.
In her 2009 declaration before the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania researcher Dr. Arupa Ganguly
recalled how in May of 1998, she and her colleague Dr.
Haig Kazazian received a notification letter from the
Myriad Genetics Director of Corporate Communications
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acknowledging Myriad’s five existing BRCA1 patents,
some of which were infringed by Ganguly and Kaza-
zian’s ongoing BRCA1 research (which included BRCA
testing) [36]. Per Ganguly’s recollection, this letter
offered a collaboration license that was ‘of very limited
scope, as it would not allow us to complete diagnostic
testing services for BRCA1, or comprehensive research
on the BRCA1 gene which we had been doing at the
lab’ [36]. After this original notification letter, a flurry of
escalating communication continued among Myriad
Genetics, Ganguly, Kazazian, and the legal counsel for
both parties. Despite researcher attempts to comply
with Myriad’s original request, increasingly aggressive
letters arrived at Penn, demanding written assurance
that BRCA testing had stopped. As Ganguly recounted,
‘I was compelled to cease all BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing,
whether for clinical or research purposes’ [36].
In this declaration, Ganguly also recalled another
instance of aggressive enforcement letters when working
on a research project sponsored by the National Cancer
Institute. As an investigator on this project, she provided
BRCA1 and BRCA2 screening to participants. In Sep-
tember 1998, the National Cancer Institute (NCI)
received a letter from Myriad Genetics concerning
patent infringement by clinical research that involved
BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing. Penn was to serve as a test-
ing core for several NCI-funded trials that included
BRCA testing and reporting. Ganguly stopped perform-
ing BRCA testing for the project after the Myriad letter.
NCI signed a 1999 Memorandum of Understanding that
gave Myriad rights to do BRCA testing for NCI-spon-
sored research unless it did not entail returning results
to those tested, or it was done only by laboratories at
the same institution as was providing patients’ clinical
care [37]. In return, Myriad deeply discounted the price
to NCI and its grantees.
The Pennsylvania researchers assumed sanctuary from
patent infringement under a research exemption [9].
The US research exemption, however, does not include
‘research using’ an invention, as opposed to a very nar-
row judge-made case law exemption for ‘philosophical’
inquiry or ‘research on’ how the invention works
[38,39]. Myriad clearly disagreed that Penn’s work war-
ranted an informal research exemption, and Penn’s use
almost certainly did not qualify for the formal legal
exemption. Myriad sent threatening letters to the
offending parties. Though the company confirmed it
had no intention of enforcing the patents against
researchers, the scope of their voluntary forbearance
from enforcement was apparently restricted to basic
research, not clinical research that entailed testing and
reporting results as part of a clinical study, even a feder-
ally funded one.
Myriad did not make a public policy statement, but
instead conducted the process through legal negotiation
and private correspondence. This is common in busi-
ness-to-business patent conflicts, but it was startling to
clinical researchers who viewed their work using BRCA
testing as a natural outgrowth of their clinical research.
In short, this style of operating through lawyers with
Penn and other academic institutions that received Myr-
iad’s letters was regarded as legalistic bullying. Instead
of countering its poor public image, Myriad let the fear
persist [9]. Gold and Carbone’s case study of Myriad
noted, ‘to the large majority of researchers who had not
been following closely Myriad’s public statements, it
seemed that Myriad was willing to block scientific
research to turn a profit’ [9]. It was a short step from
this legal maneuvering to a narrative of dark villainy.
When Myriad worked to expand its business abroad, it
encountered the Canadian Province of Ontario. In an
attempt to take the BRACAnalysis® test abroad, Myriad
licensed Canadian test rights to MDS, a Canadian firm.
The intention was for Myriad to focus on its practice in
the United States while MDS acted as an ambassador to
the Canadian provincial governments.
MDS and Myriad encountered strong resistance in the
Ontario Ministry of Health. In the Canadian public
healthcare system, Myriad’s commercialization model
and the sheer expense of the test were deemed incom-
patible with Ontario’s genetic services model. Provincial
health programs already administered genetic tests and
had the information needed to do BRCA testing, based
on the published sequences and other medical literature.
(Such publications included Myriad and Utah papers,
but also data from many other groups.) While the gov-
ernmental policy arm worked to devise a system that
could prevent the incorporation problems experienced
in Myriad’s other international ventures (including the
UK and Australia), Myriad grew increasingly suspicious
and sent out cease-and-desist letters in May 2001.
The lack of communication between Myriad and
Ontario was a misstep on both sides. The rising storm
appeared to have quelled in fall 2001, when Ontario’s
Minister of Health and the President of Myriad Genetics
agreed to meet. Myriad’s next step seriously escalated the
conflict. Myriad presented a package of letters from cur-
rent and former US government representatives and the
Biotechnology Industry Organization, threatening actions
as aggressive as ‘trade sanctions’ and cancellation of the
Biotechnology Industry Organization’s annual convention
in Toronto [9] (the authors of this paper cite these let-
ters, which they have on file). This contretemps resulted
in a storm of negative media accounts, marring Myriad’s
already unattractive public face. It also put any Canadian
politician in an impossible bind - push back against
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Myriad or bow before an American corporation whose
demands perturbed practices in the highly popular Cana-
dian provincial health systems.
The media outcry overly simplified the conflict and
reduced it to patenting, thus conflating Myriad’s poor
political strategic decisions and its particular service-
monopoly business model with the granting of BRCA
gene patents. Though Myriad’s patent protection did
give it the exclusive rights it used this dispute, the threa-
tening behaviors exhibited by Myriad were not inherent
to the patents. Indeed, it is hard not to regard Myriad’s
Canadian gambit as counterproductive, given that Myr-
iad failed to secure the Canadian market (Quebec and
some other provinces do refer some tests to Myriad, but
most testing is not through Myriad) and also never fol-
lowed up on the threats. It lost business and destroyed
its public image. The patent strong-arming failed. Myr-
iad’s decision not to sue or otherwise enforce its Cana-
dian patents further may have been in part because even
if it won the patent battle, it would still have had to get
coverage and reimbursement decisions from the very
provincial health plans it would have to sue for patent
infringement. By fighting the Ontario Health Ministry, it
was engaging its largest potential Canadian customer.
Even an uncertain victory over patents would still face a
potential battle over coverage and payment.
An aggressive patent enforcement strategy is not novel
as a business use of patents. Patents, after all, are exclu-
sive rights fully intended to forestall competition, and
enforcement letters are common among competitors.
The distinctive element here was not the act but prac-
tices standard in business being applied to researchers
and laboratories at nonprofit, government, and academic
institutions, and then against a provincial health service.
In one sense, this was a standard way to ‘clear the mar-
ket’ of competitors, but the nonstandard feature was
that the competitors were not competitor firms, and
some of the uses were tightly linked to clinical research.
This behavior lies at the heart of ill will towards Myriad,
especially in the scientific community. As Jim Watson
stated in 2010 at the Genomes Environments and Traits
Conference, ‘I hate Myriad the way some people hate
Goldman Sachs’ [40]. However standard it might have
been to enforce patents aggressively, the resentment
generated by this initial patent enforcement planted the
seed for a public interest lawsuit a decade later.
Standards of corporate practice
After Myriad published its discovery of the BRCA1 gene,
the logical next step was to develop a diagnostic test.
Naturally, just as there was a race to find the gene,
there was competition to develop the test for that gene.
The primary company contenders were OncorMed and
Myriad Genetics, due to dually issued patents on
properties of the BRCA1 gene. The licenses ultimately
ended up in the possession of Myriad, but for a brief
period both firms had intellectual property and offered
commercial BRCA testing, giving us the opportunity to
retrospectively analyze the divergent corporate practice
models, clarifying the elements of Myriad’s business
model that differed from OncorMed’s and that tarnished
Myriad’s public image.
In March 1996, the Federal Task Force on Genetic
Testing published a report making recommendations on
the regulation of genetic testing [41]. Among the most
controversial elements of this report was the position
that regulation of testing centers did not suffice to
assess the clinical validity of utility of genetic tests [41].
The report recommended expanding the regulatory cri-
teria under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement
Amendments of 1988 (CLIA), the statute that governs
laboratories. Approval by a regulatory agency was
recommended to ensure quality of informed consent,
genetic counseling, and test utility, not just whether the
test measured what it claimed, but how and whether it
affected clinical decisions and improved outcomes. The
two companies, Myriad and OncorMed, took opposite
approaches to respecting these recommendations in
their BRCA test-marketing strategies.
OncorMed was the first to market the BRCA test
commercially in 1996 [41]. Its commercialization strat-
egy complied with the Task Force’s recommendations,
including testing only in research protocols approved by
institutional review boards. To ensure minimal consu-
mer risk, testing was accompanied by consumer educa-
tion and informed consent. Pre- and post-test genetic
counseling was required, and marketing was directed to
physicians participating in research. OncorMed also had
very strict family risk criteria that women in pursuit of
testing would need to meet in order to avoid undue psy-
chological, emotional, or financial risk, and avoid over-
utilization of an expensive test that low-risk women did
not necessarily need [41]. OncorMed was publicly com-
mitted to introducing BRCA testing through a pathway
that complied with health professional standards and
only in the context of clinical research to demonstrate
safety and clinical utility.
Myriad took a different approach. Myriad marketed its
test outside research protocols, eventually including
direct-to-consumer advertising. Myriad had guidelines
rather than strict requirements about who was eligible
for BRCA testing, unlike OncorMed’s strict protocols.
Finally, Myriad, ‘did not refuse to test based on inap-
propriate patient selection, did not require a copy of
signed consent, and did not require verification of the
availability of qualified counselors to assist the patient
or that counseling had taken place’ [41]. Thus, unlike
OncorMed, Myriad did not pledge to introduce BRCA
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testing only through a research pathway that would pro-
duce evidence of clinical utility through collaborations
with public research institutions.
Clearly the two companies approached the introduc-
tion of BRCA testing from different perspectives. While
OncorMed drove their marketing strategy to meet the
requirements of health professional recommendations,
Myriad clearly had the desire to reach a broader popula-
tion. There was a clear benefit to Myriad’s approach: the
more women who are tested, more data could be col-
lected to better refine and interpret the test, and more
women could potentially learn about predisposition to a
life-threatening disease. While there is nothing inher-
ently reprehensible about this approach, it was widely
interpreted as Myriad’s emphasis on profit and lesser
commitment to creating an evidence base before widely
introducing BRCA testing.
Returning to the Herceptin® story, Genentech abided
by standards of professional practice by following a
strict FDA-approved protocol when introducing its new
treatment. However, Genentech had little choice. This is
because Genentech was developing a therapeutic pro-
duct, not a diagnostic service. As the developer of a
therapeutic, Genentech had no choice but to conduct
premarket-approval studies under strict FDA-approved
protocols. Myriad and OncorMed had a choice, because
laboratory-developed tests were not subject to FDA pre-
market approval. Whether right or wrong, ignoring the
public statements of advocacy organizations, recommen-
dations of a federal task force, and BRCA testing guide-
lines of several health professional groups did little to
ameliorate Myriad’s image as a profit-maximizing
renegade.
In developing a diagnostic for risk assessment rather
than a treatment for cancer, Myriad was arguably
already at a disadvantage in the quest for public opinion.
As crucial as BRACAnalysis® has been to the advance-
ment of breast cancer management, it simply provides
information as opposed to treating a disease. Where
Herceptin® has the power to rid a woman of her cancer,
BRACAnalysis® has the power to affirm the probable
occurrence of a woman’s cancer, or identify the genetic
cause of an existing cancer. This favors a more welcom-
ing reception for Herceptin®, because a therapeutic is
more directly connected to saving a life.
In the US healthcare system, the issue of access to
expensive drugs was widely understood to be a problem,
but a common one for therapeutics and medical devices.
However, BRACAnalysis® was similar to a routine blood
test diagnosing the presence or absence of a condition.
In fact, Mark Skolnick commented that, “there’s no dif-
ference in my mind or in the government’s mind
between a lipid assay, a protein assay, an immunoassay,
or a DNA assay” [41]. The profit margins were generally
lower for diagnostics, and access problems and cost
were unusual, although there were also debates about
expensive imaging technologies. But applying the
‘blockbuster’ financial model - charging high prices for a
patented product - was novel for a diagnostic. While
this test is under the same functional taxonomy as a
routine clinical test, patients found themselves confront-
ing barriers such as cost and access more often asso-
ciated with a pharmaceutical drug or expensive device.
The economics of product development are also quite
different between diagnostics and therapeutics. Genen-
tech had to conduct complex and very expensive clinical
trials to prove clinical safety and efficacy before market-
ing Herceptin®, but the expense of developing a BRCA
test was considerably lower. Myriad also invested in a
testing laboratory, certification of its procedures, and
incurred expenses in developing BRACAnalysis®. Much
of this investment was, however, attributable to its parti-
cular sole-source service model, not necessarily to devel-
oping BRCA testing. It could, for example, have out-
licensed the test. There were already nine laboratories
offering BRCA testing that withdrew from the market
when Myriad enforced its patents [42]. Some of these
were university or nonprofit testing laboratories (such as
Penn or Mayo). That is, while no university could
develop, test and manufacture Herceptin® except
through an industry partner, many laboratories could
and actually did introduce BRCA testing before Myriad
cleared them from the market to establish dominance
for BRACAnalysis®. They cleared the same barriers to
entry that Myriad faced. Thus, although BRACAnalysis®
and Herceptin® might have been comparable in some
ways, they occupy two very different niches in health-
care services, contributing to different public acceptance.
Comparative relationships with patient and practitioner
advocacy groups
Another contrast between Genentech (and OncorMed)
and Myriad Genetics was outreach to and collaboration
with advocacy groups representing their potential custo-
mers. While collaboration and communication between
providers and patient populations is essential to clinical
research and medical care, successful corporate behavior
is not always determined by the strength of a relation-
ship with representative groups of target consumers.
When a business monopoly is created, the necessity for
positive corporate relationships with consumers is
diminished, as there is no competition. A comparative
analysis of advocacy group interaction between Genen-
tech and the National Breast Cancer Coalition during
Herceptin® development, and between Myriad Genetics
and many patient and practitioner advocacy organiza-
tions in the introduction and marketing of BRACAnaly-
sis® reveals a crucial discrepancy in how the companies
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managed constituency relationships, especially after
initial opposition was encountered.
Myriad Genetics
Given Myriad’s focus on hereditary breast cancer diag-
nostics, a natural ally would be the prominent advocacy
group FORCE (Facing our Risk of Cancer Empowered).
FORCE was specifically organized to address the needs
of people facing inherited risk of cancers of various
types, and breast/ovarian cancer accounts for most of its
membership. Though FORCE is listed as a reference
organization on Myriad’s BRACAnalysis® information
site, the relationship between Myriad and FORCE has
become strained over time [25].
Two representative instances of Myriad’s handling of
advocacy organizations are: (1) in public commentaries
condemning Myriad’s use of its patents; and (2) concern
about Myriad’s marketing of tests direct to consumers
and to primary physicians without the professional stan-
dard of genetic counseling. In a statement to the United
States Patent and Trademark Office, FORCE Director
Sue Friedman wrote that, ‘We believe that the exclusive
gene patents of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes held by
Myriad Laboratories have had a detrimental impact on
the community we serve’ [43]. This statement continued
to elaborate on three primary issues with the patents:
the stifling of research, a negative impact on test inter-
pretation, and high cost. FORCE is correct in asserting
that these corporate issues are related to Myriad’s gene
patents, but an important point to make is that patents
do not inherently produce these kinds of behaviors. If
BRCA testing had evolved from discoveries and patents
held by Mary-Claire King, Michael Stratton or some of
the other competitors in the race to find BRCA genes, it
is possible that licensing and business plans would have
generated far less intense opposition, possibly even if
licensed exclusively to a firm that allied itself with breast
cancer organizations and followed the course that
OncorMed initially pursued [41]. Collaborating with
advocacy groups like FORCE or NBCC or BCA when
making decisions about testing policy might have chan-
ged the underlying story by changing the perceptions
and behavior of key constituency organizations.
Another example of controversial behavior is Myriad’s
decision to stop contributing to the Breast Cancer Infor-
mation Core (BIC) database in late 2004. The BIC data-
base is a public database of breast cancer susceptibility
variants encountered in clinical practice and research.
This information is made available to qualified investiga-
tors to improve clinical understanding and enable more
effective clinical interpretation of BRCA variants [44].
Myriad contributed to BIC into 2004, but then stopped
doing so, initially because of technical issues, but by
2006, it was a deliberate strategy to build a database
that would leverage the company’s large testing
experience into a proprietary database that would not
expire with Myriad’s patents. By withholding these var-
iants from the public database, Myriad gained a compe-
titive trade secret advantage over other companies. The
trade secret database will persist when their patents run
out, and will remain an advantage until public data
sources supply the same information [45]. FORCE notes
in a 2010 Genomics Law Report article: “Among other
things, such a strategy would run contrary, at least in
sprit, to a policy against extending patent monopolies
beyond their terms” [28].
The proprietary database is trade secrecy leveraged on
patent monopoly, and it is perfectly legal. By becoming
the world’s largest testing service, Myriad also discovers
new variants and incorporates those into its database.
The data are generated at Myriad’s expense (albeit from
payments for clinical services on samples sent for
genetic testing). For other genetic conditions, clinical
interpretation is largely based on public data; for BRCA
testing, Myriad has a distinct advantage, even over the
best academic centers, because of its unique data set.
Again, this is neither illegal nor illogical; but it is a
novel practice in clinical genetics, and so new for this
constituency. Leveraging a proprietary database from a
patent-based monopoly seems likely to generate contro-
versy as awareness of this practice grows.
On a similar note, FORCE has criticized Myriad’s fail-
ure to develop a promising therapeutic. In her 2012
statement to the US Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), Friedman addressed problems in dealing with
Myriad when developing drugs to treat breast cancer.
Poly-ADP ribose polymerase (PARP) inhibitors are a
promising class of drugs for cancer treatment. Cancers
with mutations in BRCA1/2 may be particularly promis-
ing to study. In order to develop this class of drugs, the
companion laboratory that develops the drug needs to
also gain FDA approval for a diagnostic [43]. Though
the most recent policy statement from FORCE [46] does
not bring up this point about therapeutic development
and Myriad has announced it is indeed working on
companion diagnostics for at least one PARP inhibitor’s
manufacturer, from its prior testimony it is clear that
Myriad’s CLIA-certified BRCA test was crucial for devel-
opment of the therapeutic, and yet licensing for drug
development was problematic for at least some manu-
facturers, and a concern to FORCE [47]. [48]Again, this
is a perfectly legal and understandable business beha-
vior, and a completely foreseeable consequence of exclu-
sive rights, but it does generate controversy and could
impede advance of a therapeutic approach [47].
Test cost and efficacy are also a source of concern to
advocacy groups. In its statement to the USPTO,
FORCE cited limited financial assistance and an increase
in test cost over time, despite dramatic drops in the cost
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of DNA sequencing. The Myriad test ‘list’ price out-of-
pocket is in the range of $3,300, somewhat higher than
its price a decade ago, with an additional $700 for
expanded BART® testing if needed (pricing quoted by a
Myriad customer service representative to one of the
authors [ALB] on 7 August 2012), which some define as
the ‘standard of care’ [49]. In her amicus brief to the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, Dr Elizabeth Swisher, an oncologist, noted,
“approximately one-third to one-half of my patients for
whom I request genetic testing do not meet Myriad’s
criteria; yet, I think most should receive this additional
[BART®] genetic testing” [49]. She also pointed to an
article in Cancer Research recommending BART® rear-
rangement testing as standard of care for high-risk
women, including those outside of Myriad’s screening
criteria [50].
The Yale Society of Genetic Counselors, an advocacy
group of physicians, nurses, and genetic counselors asso-
ciated with Yale, has been particularly outraged by the
additional cost associated with BART®. This group
posted a public open letter imploring the company to
incorporate the BART re-arrangement screening into its
comprehensive BRACAnalysis® test, instead of treating
it as an extra-cost test conducted only when BRACAna-
lysis® is negative and yet suspicion of a BRCA mutation
persists [51]. CNN covered the letter in an October
2011 news story [52]. Yale genetic counselor Ellen Matl-
off stated, “What Myriad’s doing - charging extra for
this test - is really sleazy. They’re collecting blood
money off my patients.” This inflammatory quote is
representative of the extent to which some have been
alienated by Myriad’s business practices. Many busi-
nesses encounter strident language questioning their
practices (for example, many groups have questioned
Genentech’s pricing of Avastin®, and NBCC applauded
FDA’s July 2010 withdrawal of approval for its use in
breast cancer, an indication Genentech fought hard to
keep) [53]. The intensity and regularity of public conflict
with Myriad, however, appear to be part of its DNA.
This poor communication with relevant advocacy
groups over BRACAnalysis® started in the wake of the
gene’s discovery, before the test had even been fully
developed. In 1996, the American Society of Clinical
Oncology released a set of guiding principles regarding
the management of BRCA testing [54]. In response to
these recommendations, Frances Visco of NBCC lauded
the exciting scientific discovery, but expressed concern
that public policy and medical knowledge had not kept
pace with the science, and testing should be based on
evidence of clinical utility [55]. BRCA testing should,
therefore, take place at least initially only in the context
of research, along the lines of OncorMed’s policy. Visco
advocated a direct research program to examine
treatment options for women who test positive for dele-
terious BRCA mutations, to study what counseling is
necessary and how to avoid discrimination in health
insurance and employment. She optimistically recog-
nized that:
“This is a time when we, as breast cancer activists,
need the medical community to stand with us and
recognize the need to do less, rather than more...
We have a wonderful opportunity here: we can form
a partnership between patient and physician and
thoughtfully respond to this discovery... We ask that
you take advantage of this standard of care, one that
recognizes how little we know and is designed to get
the answers.” Frances Visco, on behalf of the
National Breast Cancer Coalition [55].
In this statement, NBCC, as the pre-eminent organiza-
tion for breast cancer activism, asserted its right to a
place at the table with the scientists, policy makers, and
corporate heads charged with implementing BRCA
testing.
Mark Skolnick offered conflicting commentary in the
same issue of the Journal of Clinical Oncology. His argu-
ments directly countered Visco’s, stating that to with-
hold the launch of the test, even to make time for the
study recommended by Visco, would be to, “turn back
the clock and ignore the ability to provide knowledge to
women who seek it; to me this is unethical.” Skolnick
directly opposed the sentiments of NBCC and
announced a release plan for BRCA testing that flaunted
NBCC’s suggestions (confirmed in an interview between
the authors and Frances Visco). In the wake of Myriad’s
lawsuit, NBCC has gone on record in opposition to
Myriad’s patents, although neither NBCC nor FORCE is
a direct party in the ongoing lawsuit (however, BCA is a
party to the lawsuit against Myriad).
The role of the patents in these stories is ambiguous:
the monopoly gave Myriad strong exclusive rights that
bolstered its legal authority, and may have emboldened
it. Or perhaps the patents had little to do with the
degree to which the company abided by professional
recommendations and related to disease advocacy orga-
nizations. By heeding Visco’s recommendations in the
beginning, Myriad might have mitigated some of the
public outcry by forging alliances instead of fostering
enmity. OncorMed, the firm that had licensed Mary-
Claire King’s genetic linkage patent and Michael Strat-
ton’s BRCA patents, had committed to a research pro-
gram to build evidence for the utility of BRCA testing;
Myriad made a different strategic choice. Since both
firms had patents, it is clear patents did not drive the
differing choices, although Myriad’s business model was
enabled by its patents and subsequent emergence as
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sole provider of BRCA testing with OncorMed’s demise.
It is hard to imagine Myriad could have been as success-
ful in becoming the dominant US testing service, even
in clinical research, without its patent rights, so patent
exclusivity is a contributing cause. But the fact that
other models for deploying patented genetic diagnostics
can avoid the controversies associated with BRACAnaly-
sis® shows that business decisions about how to use
exclusivity require separate attention in the causal net-
work. Patents were necessary but not sufficient to con-
struct the narrative of villainy associated with Myriad.
Myriad emerged from its patent battles with
OncorMed with patent rights to BRCA1/2 and went on
to turn a profit, while OncorMed did not survive.
OncorMed’s strategy may have bred less controversy,
but Myriad is the firm that went on to survive as a busi-
ness. Figure 1 demonstrates this by showing Myriad’s
revenue stream from 1993 to 2012.
The settlement between the companies may well have
been driven by the perceived likely outcomes of patent
litigation or the outcome of a patent interference pro-
ceeding. Outcomes from the private settlement suggest
Myriad had the upper hand. OncorMed failed in its
BRCA testing service despite its better relations with
health professional organizations and advocacy organiza-
tions as a ‘good citizen’ vowing compliance with health
professional standards; Myriad emerged with patent
rights but poor relations with organizations representing
its customer base of physicians and families at risk of
breast and ovarian cancer. It is clear that from 2001 to
2012, Myriad’s was the more successful business strat-
egy, mainly because of its patent position.
Myriad’s strategy now faces a transition in which ill
will could have real business consequences. It faces four
challenges: new technology, expiration of patents, possi-
ble invalidation of patent claims, and erosion of its pro-
prietary database. As DNA sequencing costs drop,
whole-genome and all-exome sequencing is coming into
the cost range for sequencing just BRCA1/2. New com-
petitors might sequence not only the two BRCA genes
but also find mutations in other genes associated with
breast and ovarian cancer [56] - or all genes - for more
or less the same cost at Myriad’s two-gene test. Myriad’s
broadest patents will begin to expire in 2014. The
ongoing patent litigation has already invalidated Myr-
iad’s broadest patent claims - to methods for detecting
mutations in BRCA genes. Its claims on short DNA
fragments (for example, claims 5 and 6 of US 5,747,
282) are likely also invalid [57], and these are among the
only claims that would preclude diagnostic testing, other
than through PCR methods, which fall under claim 16
of US Patent 5,747,282. Since PCR amplification is unli-
kely to be a necessary step in future multi-gene sequen-
cing strategies, Myriad’s exclusivity in BRCA genetic
testing could be undermined by the plummeting cost of
multi-gene deep sequencing, all-exome sequencing, and
whole-genome sequencing. Depending on the outcome
of the pending case, Myriad could end up with only
Figure 1 Myriad Genetics revenue stream from 1993 to 2011. Data derived from [66].
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patents on specific mutations associated with cancer
risk, or with no patents on naturally occurring
sequences at all. (Myriad has patents on several specific
mutations and methods for detecting them, some
extending into at least 2028 [58].) Even if Myriad’s
patents are not valid, Myriad does have its proprietary
database, but the value of that database will diminish as
publicly funded research identifies disease-associated
and neutral mutations. Moreover, if payers or health
professionals demanded access to data to verify Myriad’s
determinations of cancer risk as a condition of payment,
then Myriad’s trade secret might no longer remain
secret [59].
Myriad’s ‘diagnostic blockbuster’ model has proven to
be a $400 million per year business success. It does not
follow, however, that it will withstand technological
competition, patent expiration and litigation or deter-
mined public efforts to improve interpretation of BRCA
mutations. In this way, like patented brand-name drugs,
Myriad’s blockbuster model is vulnerable to introduc-
tion of competition with patent expiry or technological
competition. OncorMed’s strategy might have produced
a loyal customer base of those ordering and seeking
BRCA testing; if Myriad’s customers are only using its
services grudgingly, and jump to competitors as soon as
they can, then Myriad’s business success could be eva-
nescent. Whether Myriad’s long-term business success
depends on its exclusive patent rights will become more
apparent over the next few years.
Genentech
In contrast to the public image of Myriad’s corporate
relations with prominent advocacy groups, Genentech
has historically been hailed as a strong community part-
ner, and an ally with the NBCC in developing Hercep-
tin® (this alliance has not survived differing positions on
Avastin® and drug pricing [60], however, so the alliance
was strategic and contingent). Genentech’s outreach to
advocates after facing determined opposition is particu-
larly instructive.
On 16 August 1995, the San Francisco Weekly ran an
article on Genentech, entitled ‘As they lay dying: cancer
advocates rage at Genentech for withholding an experi-
mental drug’ [61]. This is not the kind of press a bio-
technology firm wants in the morning paper. The article
told of Marti Nelson, a breast cancer patient and advo-
cate with BCA. Upon suspecting that she might be
aided by treatment with Herceptin®, then in the early
clinical trial stages, she pressed Genentech to provide
her the medication on a ‘compassionate use’ basis.
“Genentech refused to give Nelson HER-2/neu [sic]. She
died on Nov. 9, 1994.” A fellow advocate was quoted in
this article, declaring, “How many women have to die
on Genentech’s doorstep before they do even one com-
passionate use for HER-2/neu [sic]... We are not going
to let this rest. What Genentech is doing is really ugly.”
In the months leading up to the publication of that arti-
cle, BCA had done anything but let it rest.
On 5 December 1994, advocates marched on the Gen-
entech campus, demanding Herceptin® access for com-
passionate use [30]. This got the attention of John Curd,
Genentech’s Immunology and Oncology Clinical Trials
director (page 122 in [30]). Recognizing that he was
caught between advocacy that was “not misguided” and
the pragmatic corporate need to deny their wishes, he
sought the help of Washington-based advocate Frances
Visco [30]. As told in Robert Bazell’s book, Her-2, Curd
recalls Visco’s advice to him: “Fran Visco said to me,
‘John. I agree with you intellectually and scientifically.
Compassionate use does not make a lot of sense. I’d like
to see the data. But this is not an intellectual issue. This
is an emotional and political issue. And politically, you
have to have a compassionate use program’” [30]. With
this collaboration was born a new approach to pharma-
ceutical development at Genentech: advocates were
brought to the table.
In April 1995, advocates from many groups, including
NBCC, were invited to help design the phase III trials.
This new model of collaboration resulted in a markedly
successful trial. Visco noted in retrospect that Genen-
tech was the first pharmaceutical company that agreed
to partner with breast cancer advocates, commenting
that, “Genentech worked with us on all aspects of the
trial, from protocol design, to outreach, to oversight. In
particular, the company’s agreeing to our request that
investigators in specific communities partner with
trained activists in facilitating accrual to the trial helped
lead to record accrual”[62]. In October of 1999, Genen-
tech was awarded the Corporate Leadership Award for
their collaboration with NBCC, holding up this colla-
boration between advocates and industry as the standard
for “a new model of cancer research” [14].
Different corporate responses to conflict with advocates
A critical difference between Genentech and Myriad was
Genentech’s open and systematic cultivation of colla-
borative and amicable relationships with advocacy
groups representing their client base in response to
early conflict. Both companies encountered conflict;
Genentech made it productive while Myriad persisted
with its initial business plan. The populations served by
Genentech and Myriad overlapped to a significant
extent. Media coverage of both conflicts includes very
similar negative language alluding to companies favoring
profit over patient access. The narratives differ at the
point of resolution: Genentech made a deliberate effort
to repair a poor relationship with BCA and turned to
NBCC as an active partner, whereas Myriad did little to
reconcile with FORCE or NBCC. Myriad has made
efforts to create its own advocacy organizations, but
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these lack credibility precisely because they are corpo-
rate-affiliated, rather than collaborations with estab-
lished, credible, national organizations.
Amicable and meaningful relationships with advocacy
organizations dedicated to both patients and clinicians
can matter to a company’s success. This is not a simple
matter; NBCC is not at all happy with Genentech’s pur-
suit of the breast cancer indication for the highly expen-
sive Avastin®. But no organization sued Genentech over
its Herceptin® patent, or even over Avastin®. BCA did
join the suit against Myriad’s patent, and NBCC and
FORCE have made statements opposing Myriad’s man-
agement of its BRCA patents [43,63] even if they did
not join the plaintiffs in the case.
Genentech was wise, and ultimately more successful,
to recognize the detrimental effect of a poor corporate
image and the very practical benefit of an engaged con-
stituency that could mobilize clinical research participa-
tion. Genentech moved forward with a collaborative
approach to clinical trial implementation. Myriad’s una-
pologetic decisions to test outside health professional
recommendations and to risk alienating national organi-
zations representing breast cancer advocates is where
these stories fundamentally diverge [64].
Considering that both Genentech and Myriad had
patent protection, we can conclude that the attribution
of cause and the construction of venal narratives are to
some degree misdirected at patents. In health care,
company strategy is inherently bound to the consu-
mers that it serves, regardless of patent protection.
When the product being sold is so directly related to
health and wellbeing, the stakes and standards for
benevolent corporate behavior are raised. As Zoe
Christopher, a resource liaison for BCA stated in her
contribution to the American Civil Liberties Union’s
Take Back your Genes public campaign, “I take back
my genes so that profit will not be at the expense of
women’s lives” [65]. We speculate that it is primarily
Myriad’s failure to acknowledge this, not just their
patent protection, that has contributed to the proble-
matic escalation of the debate. ‘Profits over patients’ is
a common refrain in health care services, and by no
means restricted to BRACAnalysis® or any other parti-
cular product; neither is it confined to products and
services covered by patents. ‘Patents over patients’ is a
verse of the general ‘profit’ refrain. It is nonetheless
instructive that when Genentech encountered opposi-
tion from activists, it recalibrated its strategy for devel-
oping Herceptin®; when Myriad encountered similar
opposition, it largely ignored it, countered it, or attrib-
uted it to misinformation or lack of understanding.
What Myriad did not do was change its plan, or even
its rhetoric.
Summary
Amicus curiae and famous co-discoverer of the DNA
double helix James Watson concluded his amicus brief
by quoting his own words: “The Human Genome Pro-
ject... is as precious a body of knowledge as humankind
will ever acquire, with a potential to speak to our most
basic philosophical questions about human nature, for
purposes of good and mischief alike” [66]. In both the
scientific and political aftermath of the Human Genome
Project, Watson’s assertion has largely held true. As the
Myriad case highlights, the social, ethical, and legal
implications of genomics are continually emerging, even
decades after the discovery of DNA. For as much as
research has discovered and promises to discover, inex-
perience abounds and these questions linger: the idea-
lized promise of a simple correlation between genotype
and phenotype is gradually being replaced by a more
sophisticated understanding of the science and the disci-
plinary maturity to accept what will perhaps always
remain a mystery, the complicated relation between gen-
otype, biology and health. By analogy, this history also
suggests a need for sophistication of how the accompa-
nying social narratives of that science come to be con-
structed. If this mystery exists in the science, surely we
can expect the same degree of uncertainty in the ethical
and legal ramifications of that science, including the way
business strategies are crafted and adjusted (or not).
Several strategic decisions contributed to Myriad’s
abysmal corporate image. By comparing Myriad’s deci-
sions to those of Genentech and OncorMed, it becomes
apparent that the story is not just about patents. There
are many points of contention, and the full weight of
Myriad’s controversial business model should not be
attributed to patents alone. Arguments about patentable
subject matter are playing out between the American
Civil Liberties Union and its plaintiffs and Myriad and
the defendants in the case before the US Supreme
Court, but our purpose here is to stress that the Myriad
case is an exceptional one, and not the rule. The legal
debate has focused solely on patents, but Myriad was
largely sued because of its business model: patents pro-
vided a legal scapegoat. While many would agree that
Myriad should be held accountable for the practices that
patents did indeed allow them to pursue, the legal con-
sequences are ultimately not only aimed at the vehicle
driving these practices, but also at the public road this
vehicle is utilizing, the patent system. In short, this com-
parative case study shows it is not only - or even mainly
- about the patents.
The risk of a patent-centered narrative is that the cru-
cial nuances of this story will be lost in monomaniacal
attention to whether genes can be patented, to the
neglect of business practices that are equally to blame.
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The social issues that have accompanied the vigorous,
often acrimonious, debate about gene patents have both
legal and moral elements, and that debate will go on,
regardless of court decisions in the ongoing BRCA lawsuit.
The public debate has been impoverished in two
respects, by assuming: (1) that the cause of the problems
underlying the debate are inherently due to patents; and
(2) that eliminating gene patents will solve those pro-
blems. Patents contribute and enable business practices,
but many genes have been patented that did not lead to
the same problems. The story of BRCA testing is about
business decisions that did indeed rest on enforcing
exclusive rights in the US market - but the story is also
about failing to include advocacy organizations and dis-
regarding health professional standards. Patents matter,
but so do business practices.
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